"The courting of would-be Canadian PM Justin Trudeau, by Chinese corruption suspect Michael Ching Mo Yeung"
How graft suspect Michael Ching allied himself with Canada's Liberal leader, with the help of ex-minister Raymond Chan; pro-Trudeau political organisation was based in Ching's office, and Liberal special advisor Wang Ting Ting acted as a director.
Article in South China Morning Post by Ian Young
http://www.scmp.com/news/world/article/1862338/courting-would-be-canadian-pm-justin-trudeau-chinese-corruption-suspect#
Wednesday, September 30, 2015
Monday, September 28, 2015
PC, Lib, NDP Perspectives on China in Munk Centre Foreign Policy Debate
So why did the Munk Centre decide to not raise China in the foreign policy debate? #elxn42 #MunkDebate
My views are quoted in "The big issue that went unmentioned in the foreign policy debate" - The Globe and Mail:
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/globe-politics-insider/china-isnt-much-of-an-issue-in-this-election-why-not/article26580739/
My views are quoted in "The big issue that went unmentioned in the foreign policy debate" - The Globe and Mail:
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/globe-politics-insider/china-isnt-much-of-an-issue-in-this-election-why-not/article26580739/
“This debate was where it was expected the parties would make a clear statement of their differing approaches to the challenge China makes to Canadian interests and values,” said Charles Burton, a China expert at Brock University.
He accused debate organizers of not wanting “to be the platform where our important concerns about the challenge that the Chinese regime presents to Canada are aired.”
The key question is policy toward Chinese investment in Canada, and how to respond to Chinese Government human rights violations and non-tariff barriers to Canadian trade and investment, as well as continued Chinese cyber attacks on Canadian Government servers as well as other economic and military espionage.
The key question is policy toward Chinese investment in Canada, and how to respond to Chinese Government human rights violations and non-tariff barriers to Canadian trade and investment, as well as continued Chinese cyber attacks on Canadian Government servers as well as other economic and military espionage.
Sunday, September 20, 2015
U.S. and China Seek Arms Deal for Cyberspace
U.S. and China Seek Arms Deal for Cyberspace http://nyti.ms/1Kn0Ai8
The word "sceptical" falls far short of my attitude to this.
Thursday, September 17, 2015
Tuesday, September 15, 2015
For the first time ever, China’s Communist Party is openly questioning its legitimacy
For the first time ever, China’s Communist Party is openly questioning its legitimacy - Quartz
Seems "vanguard of the proletariat" no longer suits
Seems "vanguard of the proletariat" no longer suits
Thursday, September 03, 2015
Tuesday, September 01, 2015
My Op-Ed "Who will march with China at Xi’s parade?" - The Globe and Mail
Who will march with China at Xi’s parade? - The Globe and Mail
"Any shortcomings of China’s governance will continue to be ascribed to the foreign-inspired moral failings of corrupted individual officials, not to any deficiencies in the political and economic system itself.
"Any shortcomings of China’s governance will continue to be ascribed to the foreign-inspired moral failings of corrupted individual officials, not to any deficiencies in the political and economic system itself.
Over time, the regime’s response will most certainly be more sabre-rattling assertions of nationalism, to rally the public behind Mr. Xi’s leadership. Thursday’s parade could be just the beginning of a new era in Chinese Communist militarism."
Saturday, August 22, 2015
坚定改革信心 保持定力和韧劲 / "A strange editorial in China's state-run newspaper is spelling trouble for Xi Jinping"
越是在改革形势总体向好之时，人们越需要清醒地意识到，深化改革必将触及中国政治、经济、社会、军事、外交多个领域的种种深层次问题，必将涉及中国这一庞大经济体肌体造血功能重构、运行更加健康的根本问题，困难之大，阻力之多，不适应改革乃至反对改革的力量之顽固凶猛复杂诡异，可能超出人们的想象。正因为如此，当前特别需要强调增强改革定力、保持改革韧劲。
This does not bode at all well.
English language report in South China Morning Post
"A strange editorial in China's state-run newspaper is spelling trouble for Xi Jinping"
Monday, August 17, 2015
My Op-Ed "China learns it can’t control the laws of economics" - The Globe and Mail
China learns it can’t control the laws of economics - The Globe and Mail
"Economist Friedrich Hayek wrote, “The curious task of economics is to demonstrate to men how little they really know about what they imagine they can design.” But Mr. Hayek was a champion of classical liberal economics, and China’s state capitalism operates quite differently. The bottom-line factor in China’s economic decline seems tied to the political, not economic, policies of Xi Jinping’s leadership since he became General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party in 2012."
"Economist Friedrich Hayek wrote, “The curious task of economics is to demonstrate to men how little they really know about what they imagine they can design.” But Mr. Hayek was a champion of classical liberal economics, and China’s state capitalism operates quite differently. The bottom-line factor in China’s economic decline seems tied to the political, not economic, policies of Xi Jinping’s leadership since he became General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party in 2012."
Lament 25 Years On
Lament 25 Years On
It has been 25 years since I left Ottawa to take up my current position at Brock University in St Catharines. I feel very grateful to Brock University for providing me with a stable platform for my work on China and relations between China and the West. Over these years most of my focus has been on matters pertaining to Ottawa and Beijing. At the same time I have tried to "pay back" Brock University in St. Catharines by being conscientious about teaching undergraduates and supervising graduate students and by participating in committee work in service to the Institution.
But reflecting over my life in these 3 places: St. Catharines, Ottawa and Beijing, I feel some degree of disappointment over how things have developed compared to my aspirations of a quarter century before.
With regard to Brock University in St Catharines: the decline in quality of education there is comparable to what has been happening at postsecondary institutions throughout the West, albeit things are arguably worse at Brock than most Canadian universities.
The bottom line is that my undergraduate class sizes have increased by a factor of 8 to 10. My students have little contact with me compared to the high degree of mentoring face-to-face that I was able to do with students in the early years of my career.
Part of it is is attributable the influence of technology. Students prefer to obtain information and interact with their professors via the internet. So they do not stop by my office or even pass through the doors of the University Library as they used to as a matter of course in the undergrad life of 25 years before.
Nowadays I frequently receive emails from students asking for letters of reference I would not recognise if I walked past them in the halls. They have no recourse but to approach me about this as so many of the courses are now taught by grossly underpaid contract instructors who cannot be found when it comes time to get letters of reference a couple of years later. The upshot is that I write a lot more letters of reference than I used to but have much less to say about the students I am ostensibly recommending.
The expansion of enrolment has naturally meant that many students now get in who would not have been considered intellectually qualified for tertiary education 25 years ago. It is disheartening to observe the average marks given out has not declined commensurately, but standards certainly have.
Over this period at Brock and most other universities in Ontario, there has been a massive increase in the proportion of non-teaching administrative personnel. These people largely have no sympathy with scholarship as an inherent good. They could just as well be working for a municipal government or in the human resources department of a business corporation. The professors are perceived by them as "service providers" and therefore we are subject to many humiliations by these people that would have been unthinkable in years past. Morale among the scholars in the Academy is much lower than it was 25 years ago as a consequence.
But to end on a positive note, thanks to the internet research has been enormously facilitated. 25 years ago I would frequently take carloads of graduate students to the Robarts Library in Toronto where we would furiously photocopy articles from scholarly journals for several hours before a late dinner in Chinatown and long drive home. Today with a few clicks of a mouse the materials I need to do my work perfectly reproduced on my computer screen. My scholarly productivity and the quality of my output has increased considerably as a consequence.
With regard to Ottawa's Approach to China: while the suppression of the Tiananmen democracy movement was still the dominant factor in Canada China relations 25 years ago there was still a great deal of optimism that China was moving towards democratic governance and wholehearted integration into international regimes such as the UN and WTO. This would be of enormous importance to Canada in years ahead. It was therefore incumbent on the Government of Canada to significantly strengthen our capacity to engage China substantively and meaningfully.
On the positive side, compared to when I was sent to the Canadian Embassy on my first posting as "Post Sinologist" and Head of the Cultural and Scientific Affairs Section, there are now some diplomats posted to China who have been there earlier in their careers and so have developed some expertise in the ins and outs of Canada-China relations.
But we are still sending people to Beijing after a very expensive two years of language training in Ottawa. While in China they cannot fluently read a Chinese newspaper or understand the Chinese TV news much less read diplomatic correspondence or engage with Chinese officials without interpretation. This is in rather severe contrast to the level of linguistic expertise and cultural knowledge of the people that China sends to its Embassy in Ottawa.
Moreover the problem of Chinese regime influence over Canadian politicians, civil servants and others is largely unaddressed. But former foreign ministers, ambassadors and more junior diplomats seem to end up on lucrative boards of directors and have other involvements that are directly or indirectly funded by Chinese state sources on retirement. How this possibility may consciously or unconsciously affect their decisions on China files is an open question.
But we have signed agreements with China that seem to largely favour the Chinese side on foreign investment protection, allowing Chinese police to come to Canada to investigate allegedly corrupt Chinese exiles here without reciprocity and so on. But we make little progress on "political" consular cases important to us such as Burlington's Huseyin Celil or Kevin Garratt from Vancouver.
Another area of concern that has not been addressed is the weak legislation that has Canada has to prosecute persons who have transferred Canadian classified information and technologies (such as related to military weaponry) to agents of a foreign power. As a result the USA and other Western nations are sending people trafficking secrets to China away for long prison terms at rates of dozens a year. But Canada has failed to bring a single alleged perpetrator of this kind of serious criminal betrayal of Canada to justice as the RCMP has to date been able to satisfy the Canadian Department of Justice that it has enough evidence to make a viable case that can be successfully prosecuted under the current legislation.
Basically Canada is not as effective in our relations with China as we could be. We have not sent strong political appointments to Beijing as we have done to other nations important to Canada. Our commitment to engage better with China in future remains a low priority for Government.
With regard to Beijing's domestic politics: When China's policies of opening and reform were announced in 1978 I was a student living at Fudan University in Shanghai. There was great optimism for the future and enthusiasm to be a part of it among my Chinese dorm-mates in those years. There was confidence among my table mates in the University canteen that we would complete the work of the intellectuals of the May 4, 1919 movement and finally bring science and democracy and freedom to mainland China. I got very caught up in this myself.
The mid-80s movements against "bourgeois liberalisation" and Western "spiritual pollution" and against humanism did worry me that the reform and opening might fail.
But the 1989 Tiananmen movement despite its tragic suppression encouraged me that the Chinese people yearn for the entitlements of citizenship, human rights, freedom from patriarchal authoritarianism.
By the late 90s there were the beginnings of democratic elections with universal suffrage at the village level, increasing suggestions that China would legitimise civil society, China's signing of the UN's International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and and shortly thereafter China's successful accession to the WTO.
Unfortunately under Xi Jinping civil society is being ruthlessly suppressed, ethnic minorities subject to harsh assimilationist measure, activist lawyers imprisoned and the norms of liberal democracy explicitly denounced as inconsistent with the maintenance of the dominant authority of the Chinese Communist Party.
China's political future has become disquieting uncertain.
I wonder if all of my years and years of close collaboration with the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and the Central Party School on policy issues have been for naught in the end.
I am really disappointed with the way things are going in China now. I am heading towards the age when people start retiring. I have been working on Chinese politics more or less full-time since I was a teenager. In many ways the current crop of leaders, so cynical as they are, cause me even more despair than all their predecessors.
God willing, I expect to be able to be professionally active for another 15 years or so. I do hope that by then I can look back with some satisfaction that the things that I hold dear in Canada and China will be in much better condition than I find them today.
That being said the happy and deeply meaningful memories of my family and many close friends in China at least will remain to be cherished.
Yes, I feel some disappointment over how things have gone these 25 years. But overall, I have few regrets.
It has been 25 years since I left Ottawa to take up my current position at Brock University in St Catharines. I feel very grateful to Brock University for providing me with a stable platform for my work on China and relations between China and the West. Over these years most of my focus has been on matters pertaining to Ottawa and Beijing. At the same time I have tried to "pay back" Brock University in St. Catharines by being conscientious about teaching undergraduates and supervising graduate students and by participating in committee work in service to the Institution.
But reflecting over my life in these 3 places: St. Catharines, Ottawa and Beijing, I feel some degree of disappointment over how things have developed compared to my aspirations of a quarter century before.
With regard to Brock University in St Catharines: the decline in quality of education there is comparable to what has been happening at postsecondary institutions throughout the West, albeit things are arguably worse at Brock than most Canadian universities.
The bottom line is that my undergraduate class sizes have increased by a factor of 8 to 10. My students have little contact with me compared to the high degree of mentoring face-to-face that I was able to do with students in the early years of my career.
Part of it is is attributable the influence of technology. Students prefer to obtain information and interact with their professors via the internet. So they do not stop by my office or even pass through the doors of the University Library as they used to as a matter of course in the undergrad life of 25 years before.
Nowadays I frequently receive emails from students asking for letters of reference I would not recognise if I walked past them in the halls. They have no recourse but to approach me about this as so many of the courses are now taught by grossly underpaid contract instructors who cannot be found when it comes time to get letters of reference a couple of years later. The upshot is that I write a lot more letters of reference than I used to but have much less to say about the students I am ostensibly recommending.
The expansion of enrolment has naturally meant that many students now get in who would not have been considered intellectually qualified for tertiary education 25 years ago. It is disheartening to observe the average marks given out has not declined commensurately, but standards certainly have.
Over this period at Brock and most other universities in Ontario, there has been a massive increase in the proportion of non-teaching administrative personnel. These people largely have no sympathy with scholarship as an inherent good. They could just as well be working for a municipal government or in the human resources department of a business corporation. The professors are perceived by them as "service providers" and therefore we are subject to many humiliations by these people that would have been unthinkable in years past. Morale among the scholars in the Academy is much lower than it was 25 years ago as a consequence.
But to end on a positive note, thanks to the internet research has been enormously facilitated. 25 years ago I would frequently take carloads of graduate students to the Robarts Library in Toronto where we would furiously photocopy articles from scholarly journals for several hours before a late dinner in Chinatown and long drive home. Today with a few clicks of a mouse the materials I need to do my work perfectly reproduced on my computer screen. My scholarly productivity and the quality of my output has increased considerably as a consequence.
With regard to Ottawa's Approach to China: while the suppression of the Tiananmen democracy movement was still the dominant factor in Canada China relations 25 years ago there was still a great deal of optimism that China was moving towards democratic governance and wholehearted integration into international regimes such as the UN and WTO. This would be of enormous importance to Canada in years ahead. It was therefore incumbent on the Government of Canada to significantly strengthen our capacity to engage China substantively and meaningfully.
On the positive side, compared to when I was sent to the Canadian Embassy on my first posting as "Post Sinologist" and Head of the Cultural and Scientific Affairs Section, there are now some diplomats posted to China who have been there earlier in their careers and so have developed some expertise in the ins and outs of Canada-China relations.
But we are still sending people to Beijing after a very expensive two years of language training in Ottawa. While in China they cannot fluently read a Chinese newspaper or understand the Chinese TV news much less read diplomatic correspondence or engage with Chinese officials without interpretation. This is in rather severe contrast to the level of linguistic expertise and cultural knowledge of the people that China sends to its Embassy in Ottawa.
Moreover the problem of Chinese regime influence over Canadian politicians, civil servants and others is largely unaddressed. But former foreign ministers, ambassadors and more junior diplomats seem to end up on lucrative boards of directors and have other involvements that are directly or indirectly funded by Chinese state sources on retirement. How this possibility may consciously or unconsciously affect their decisions on China files is an open question.
But we have signed agreements with China that seem to largely favour the Chinese side on foreign investment protection, allowing Chinese police to come to Canada to investigate allegedly corrupt Chinese exiles here without reciprocity and so on. But we make little progress on "political" consular cases important to us such as Burlington's Huseyin Celil or Kevin Garratt from Vancouver.
Another area of concern that has not been addressed is the weak legislation that has Canada has to prosecute persons who have transferred Canadian classified information and technologies (such as related to military weaponry) to agents of a foreign power. As a result the USA and other Western nations are sending people trafficking secrets to China away for long prison terms at rates of dozens a year. But Canada has failed to bring a single alleged perpetrator of this kind of serious criminal betrayal of Canada to justice as the RCMP has to date been able to satisfy the Canadian Department of Justice that it has enough evidence to make a viable case that can be successfully prosecuted under the current legislation.
Basically Canada is not as effective in our relations with China as we could be. We have not sent strong political appointments to Beijing as we have done to other nations important to Canada. Our commitment to engage better with China in future remains a low priority for Government.
With regard to Beijing's domestic politics: When China's policies of opening and reform were announced in 1978 I was a student living at Fudan University in Shanghai. There was great optimism for the future and enthusiasm to be a part of it among my Chinese dorm-mates in those years. There was confidence among my table mates in the University canteen that we would complete the work of the intellectuals of the May 4, 1919 movement and finally bring science and democracy and freedom to mainland China. I got very caught up in this myself.
The mid-80s movements against "bourgeois liberalisation" and Western "spiritual pollution" and against humanism did worry me that the reform and opening might fail.
But the 1989 Tiananmen movement despite its tragic suppression encouraged me that the Chinese people yearn for the entitlements of citizenship, human rights, freedom from patriarchal authoritarianism.
By the late 90s there were the beginnings of democratic elections with universal suffrage at the village level, increasing suggestions that China would legitimise civil society, China's signing of the UN's International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and and shortly thereafter China's successful accession to the WTO.
Unfortunately under Xi Jinping civil society is being ruthlessly suppressed, ethnic minorities subject to harsh assimilationist measure, activist lawyers imprisoned and the norms of liberal democracy explicitly denounced as inconsistent with the maintenance of the dominant authority of the Chinese Communist Party.
China's political future has become disquieting uncertain.
I wonder if all of my years and years of close collaboration with the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and the Central Party School on policy issues have been for naught in the end.
I am really disappointed with the way things are going in China now. I am heading towards the age when people start retiring. I have been working on Chinese politics more or less full-time since I was a teenager. In many ways the current crop of leaders, so cynical as they are, cause me even more despair than all their predecessors.
God willing, I expect to be able to be professionally active for another 15 years or so. I do hope that by then I can look back with some satisfaction that the things that I hold dear in Canada and China will be in much better condition than I find them today.
That being said the happy and deeply meaningful memories of my family and many close friends in China at least will remain to be cherished.
Yes, I feel some disappointment over how things have gone these 25 years. But overall, I have few regrets.
Wednesday, July 08, 2015
My Op-Ed "Taking stock of the Chinese stock market slide" in today's Globe and Mail
My Op-Ed "Taking stock of the Chinese stock market slide" in today's Globe and Mail: http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-debate/taking-stock-of-the-chinese-stock-market-slide/article25368429/
"The larger question relates to the implications for the Communist Party rule in general. When China’s stock markets were booming, the Communist media celebrated this as a sign of the superiority of the country’s authoritarian state capitalist model of “socialism with Chinese characteristics.” But when things are going very wrong, it is the party that is seen as accountable for the consequences."
My views on the Chinese stock market are quoted in Nathan Vanderklippe's report "China’s investors fear leaders ‘cannot control’ swoon" also in today's Globe and Mail: http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/international-business/asian-pacific-business/chinas-stock-rout-continues-markets-full-of-panic/article25349457/
"The larger question relates to the implications for the Communist Party rule in general. When China’s stock markets were booming, the Communist media celebrated this as a sign of the superiority of the country’s authoritarian state capitalist model of “socialism with Chinese characteristics.” But when things are going very wrong, it is the party that is seen as accountable for the consequences."
My views on the Chinese stock market are quoted in Nathan Vanderklippe's report "China’s investors fear leaders ‘cannot control’ swoon" also in today's Globe and Mail: http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/international-business/asian-pacific-business/chinas-stock-rout-continues-markets-full-of-panic/article25349457/
Wednesday, July 01, 2015
Another case wherein China will not return a citizen who has fled abroad
http://shanghaiist.com/2015/07/01/chinese-overseas-student-accused-killing-girlfriend-arrested-homeland.php
It appears much the same as the circumstances of the Ang Li murder of Amanda Zhao in Burnaby a few years back. The murderer fled to China and our request that he be returned to Canada to face Canadian justice was rebuffed.
The young victim has such an open and honest face in the photo --- such a tragedy!
It appears much the same as the circumstances of the Ang Li murder of Amanda Zhao in Burnaby a few years back. The murderer fled to China and our request that he be returned to Canada to face Canadian justice was rebuffed.
The young victim has such an open and honest face in the photo --- such a tragedy!
Wednesday, June 17, 2015
The murky world of Chinese influence - My Op-Ed in The Globe and Mail
The murky world of Chinese influence - The Globe and Mail
Canadian officials and politicians who favour closer economic relations with China – playing down concerns about human rights, espionage, unfair trade practices, support for repressive Third World regimes and so on – have generally not been of Chinese origin. It’s troubling that many of these same people, after they leave politics, end up making serious money in China-related trade or lucrative China-related board of directors’ appointments. This most recently applies to Mr. Baird himself and very much so to his predecessor David Emerson, but also to former prime ministers, former Canadian ambassadors to China and many others, of all political stripes. Chinese money is seemingly welcomed almost everywhere in Canada, but it inevitably comes with strings attached: expectations of reciprocal “friendship” that lead back to the Chinese Communists and their ever-more influential global business conglomerates headquartered in Beijing.
It appeared in the Globe and Mail print edition on June 18, 2015
Much the same content in a video interview broadcast on TheRebel.media: http://www.therebel.media/_it_s_not_just_about_michael_chan_expert
Canadian officials and politicians who favour closer economic relations with China – playing down concerns about human rights, espionage, unfair trade practices, support for repressive Third World regimes and so on – have generally not been of Chinese origin. It’s troubling that many of these same people, after they leave politics, end up making serious money in China-related trade or lucrative China-related board of directors’ appointments. This most recently applies to Mr. Baird himself and very much so to his predecessor David Emerson, but also to former prime ministers, former Canadian ambassadors to China and many others, of all political stripes. Chinese money is seemingly welcomed almost everywhere in Canada, but it inevitably comes with strings attached: expectations of reciprocal “friendship” that lead back to the Chinese Communists and their ever-more influential global business conglomerates headquartered in Beijing.
It appeared in the Globe and Mail print edition on June 18, 2015
Much the same content in a video interview broadcast on TheRebel.media: http://www.therebel.media/_it_s_not_just_about_michael_chan_expert
Monday, June 15, 2015
House of Commons Committees - FAAE (41-2) - Hong Kong's Democratic Future - Report Recommendations
House of Commons Committees - FAAE (41-2) - Hong Kong's Democratic Future - Report
Recommendation 1: The Committee recommends that the Government of Canada state its support for the democratic aspirations of Hong Kong people, including the need for genuine universal suffrage in the election of their political leaders.
Recommendation 2: The Committee recommends that the Government of Canada reiterate its support for the 'one country, two systems' principle, and for the 1984 Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Question of Hong Kong.
Recommendation 3: The Committee recommends that the Government of Canada encourage dialogue that can lead to governance reforms in Hong Kong that are broadly accepted by all concerned.
Recommendation 1: The Committee recommends that the Government of Canada state its support for the democratic aspirations of Hong Kong people, including the need for genuine universal suffrage in the election of their political leaders.
Recommendation 2: The Committee recommends that the Government of Canada reiterate its support for the 'one country, two systems' principle, and for the 1984 Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Question of Hong Kong.
Recommendation 3: The Committee recommends that the Government of Canada encourage dialogue that can lead to governance reforms in Hong Kong that are broadly accepted by all concerned.
Wednesday, May 20, 2015
Report in Globe and Mail highlighting inadequacy of Canadian legislation re: industrial espionage
"Canadian observers say the 32-count indictment, which was unsealed late on Monday, highlights the prevalence and severity of industrial espionage in North America, and underscores the need for Canada to adopt more stringent laws. Canada has no dedicated act on trade secrets and economic espionage and has not successfully prosecuted a similar case, experts say."
Friday, May 15, 2015
Some of Charles Burton's Responses to Questions from Commons Foreign Affairs C'tee on Hong Kong
If we do nothing and take the attitude that China is a very large country, Hong Kong is a small place, and our interest is in keeping the Chinese Communist regime happy so that it won't interfere with our trade, that would be exactly what the Chinese government would hope would happen, that we would simply sacrifice Hong Kong to the greater good to Canada of other aspects in the relationship with China.
I would argue that this sort of irresponsible non-response by us would have the opposite effect, because we would lose respect from the Government of China. We could expect them to be pushing the envelope more in areas of concern to us, such as the consular case of Kevin Garratt, cyber-espionage in Canada, and unfair trade arrangements that do concern us now.
===
I would argue that this sort of irresponsible non-response by us would have the opposite effect, because we would lose respect from the Government of China. We could expect them to be pushing the envelope more in areas of concern to us, such as the consular case of Kevin Garratt, cyber-espionage in Canada, and unfair trade arrangements that do concern us now.
===
It's clear that China has serious economic interests in Canada, in the energy and mineral sector, and that these political issues will not damage the overall Chinese interest in getting what Canada has to offer as a stable supplier of energy and minerals products. I think a lot of it is rhetoric designed to try to cow the Government of Canada into not speaking out on our concerns over allegations of serious human rights abuses in China.
Up to now, I don't think any relationship has been established between Canadian statements and our economic or other interests in China. I actually did a study of this, looking at the statistics to see, for example, if we were doing better with China on trade under the Chrétien period of quiet diplomacy on human rights, and I could not find any relationship. In fact, our market share in China increased under Mr. Harper after he made his statements about not selling out our values to the almighty dollar.
===
In general, our expectation is that the Chinese government should be respecting international agreements that are made, and that would extend to the WTO and all the international agreements that China has ascribed to.
I think there is a tendency of the Government of China to push the envelope beyond the normal range for interpretation of these agreements, and I think that we should be making it clear that we are not going to stand idly by and let that happen. With regard to article 45, raised by Mr. Garneau, it's the same sort of thing. There is no question that when the Government of China and the Government of Britain were representing to the Government of Canada how this thing was going to pan out, it was not going to be a sham election in 2017 but an election where Hong Kong people would be able to freely elect representatives of the aspirations of the people in Hong Kong so that they could maintain the character of Hong Kong and the existing laws and practices, including freedom of speech and freedom of expression, until the 50 years were over. That's the way we understood it, and that's the way it was represented to us by the Chinese.
Do Hong Kong people who are claiming that they support the agreement genuinely want to see their human rights limited? How many people want their Internet access limited? How many members of the Roman Catholic Church would like to see the Roman Catholic Church become an illegal organization, as it is in the People's Republic of China, where they won't recognize the authority of a foreign figure, the Pope, and have to belong to something called the Catholic Patriotic Association?
People yearn to enjoy the benefits of citizenship and to be free, and I think that this is what we want to preserve in Hong Kong, because we can. In terms of China, we don't have an international agreement that compels the Chinese government to treat its people in any particular way beyond the normal expectations of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, but its sovereignty over Hong Kong is limited by the joint declaration. We endorse that declaration, and if we don't hold them to it, the Chinese government will continue accordingly in its relations with Canada, which is that we don't expect them to maintain the promises they make to us.
House of Commons Committees - FAAE (41-2) - Evidence - Number 058 Situation in Hong Kong including my evidence
House of Commons Committees - FAAE (41-2) - Evidence - Number 058
Situation in Hong Kong including my evidence
Situation in Hong Kong including my evidence
Thursday, May 07, 2015
Burton - Presentation to the Foreign Affairs Committee - May 5, 2015
Charles Burton
Presentation to the Foreign Affairs Committee
May 5, 2015
Thank you very much for inviting me to appear today to give evidence on the situation in Hong Kong.
Let me first provide some context based on my knowledge of Canada's interaction with the Government of China and the British Embassy in Beijing with regard to the arrangements being made made for Hong Kong's return to Chinese sovereignty when I served as a diplomat at the Canadian Embassy to China on my first posting in the early 1990s.
Canada was quite engaged with this matter largely due to 2 major factors.
First of all, the Chinese community in Canada was very concerned about what would happen in Hong Kong after 1997. At the time the Chinese community in Canada consisted largely of Cantonese speaking Canadians most of whom had connections with Hong Kong.
As a result of the political uncertainty we had very high levels of immigration from Hong Kong to Canada in the years leading up to 1997.
According to the website of our Canadian Consulate General (and I quote) “Hong Kong boasts one of the largest Canadian communities abroad (an estimated 295,000). This community, along with some 500,000 people of Hong Kong descent in Canada, plays a dynamic role in building vibrant bilateral relations.”
There are estimates that place the numbers of Canadians in Hong Kong even higher.
I would say as an aside that if the current crackdown on civic liberties in Hong Kong continues we could see a large number of people leaving Hong Kong to resume residency in Canada.
And if things continue to deteriorate there we could have quite a significant increase in the number of consular cases involving Canadians in Hong Kong.
Secondly, at that time when the issue of Hong Kong’s future was in question, much of Canada's trade with China was brokered through Hong Kong. Canadian companies that did business in China typically had their headquarters in Hong Kong in those years.
So it was really very important to Canada that the transition to Chinese sovereignty be done in such a way as to protect our significant economic interests there.
We sought and received assurances from both the government of the People's Republic of China and the government of the United Kingdom over the promises of “one country-two systems” “no change for 50 years” and that “Hong Kong people would govern Hong Kong”.
With regard to the last it was clear that this meant that Hong Kong would be governed by Hong Kong people who would represent the aspirations and interests of the people of Hong Kong.
There was absolutely no indication that this would mean that the citizens of Hong Kong would be told in effect “you can elect whoever you want providing it is either Tweedledum or Tweedledee, both of whom would be representing the interests of the Chinese Communist Party and its business elite in Hong Kong” rather than the other way round.
We had good feelings about the 50 years no change formula. We understood from statements by Mr Deng Xiaoping and his successors that China intended to make a political transformation to modern norms of democracy and the rule of law.
So we were expecting that the “one country, two systems” issue would be resolved by China gradually coming into compliance with international noms of governance.
Indeed, over the period of the negotations on Hong Kong there were strong indications that this was happening already
For example, in the early 1990s China began to have free and democratic elections of village heads. We expected that this would expand upwards in a staged way to county heads provincial governors and ultimately a universal suffrage election for the President of China.
Moreover in 1998 China signed the UN's International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Canada was immediately very forthcoming with offers of developmental aid to assist the Chinese authorities in bringing Chinese law and practices into compliance with this Covenant and with assistance in how to fulfil the relevant UN reporting requirements
Indeed up until 2012 the Chinese leadership still gave periodic assurances that democratic political institutions and full rule of law were social goals, although the leaders always added the caveat that these could not be fully realised immediately due to historical, cultural and developmental factors.
So we were told should wait patiently until the moment came. That was a lot of waiting, needless to say.
But after he assumed power late in 2012, the current leader. President Xi Jinping made a series of statements strongly and explicitly renouncing key political ideals such as constitutionalism; freedom of the press, speech and assembly; judicial independence; and separation of powers as incompatible with sustained Communist Party rule in China.
One of the Party’s official newspapers the Global Times newspaper has condemned these "a ticket to hell” for China.
So I would see the recent backtracking on Hong Kong people governing Hong Kong and the fraying promise of 50 years no change as connected to this new political orientation of the Chinese Communist Party.
So where does that leave Canada?
It is clear that the Chinese government sovereignty over Hong Kong is conditioned by its international agreements comprised by the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law.
I would therefore suggest that the Government of Canada take the lead with like-minded nations informally monitoring China's compliance with the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law. It is very much in Canada's national interest to do this
Finally I would say in general that it would be prudent for Canada to respond to the Government of China's discarding of its commitment to democracy and human rights (as we understand those terms) and the moving backwards on legal protections for site Chinese citizens
by readjusting our 3 part foreign policy mix of realising Canadian prosperity, security and Canadian values in our programming with China to re-emphasise our commitment to Canadian values,
while strengthening our programming with China to promote trade and investment and to address Chinese espionage in Canada.
We are perceived as offering tacit consent for what it is happening in Hong Kong and in China at large by not speaking out and following up what we say with constructive programming.
I do not think that this will have a significant impact on our trade with China if we manage it correctly. And Canada is strengthened in our foreign relations if we gain us more respect by being true to what we believe.
Ministers Baird and Paradis noted last December 10 in their statement to mark Human Rights Day “Canada stands for what is right and just, regardless of whether it is popular, convenient or expedient.”
I believe that the people of Canada expect nothing less from us.
Presentation to the Foreign Affairs Committee
May 5, 2015
Thank you very much for inviting me to appear today to give evidence on the situation in Hong Kong.
Let me first provide some context based on my knowledge of Canada's interaction with the Government of China and the British Embassy in Beijing with regard to the arrangements being made made for Hong Kong's return to Chinese sovereignty when I served as a diplomat at the Canadian Embassy to China on my first posting in the early 1990s.
Canada was quite engaged with this matter largely due to 2 major factors.
First of all, the Chinese community in Canada was very concerned about what would happen in Hong Kong after 1997. At the time the Chinese community in Canada consisted largely of Cantonese speaking Canadians most of whom had connections with Hong Kong.
As a result of the political uncertainty we had very high levels of immigration from Hong Kong to Canada in the years leading up to 1997.
According to the website of our Canadian Consulate General (and I quote) “Hong Kong boasts one of the largest Canadian communities abroad (an estimated 295,000). This community, along with some 500,000 people of Hong Kong descent in Canada, plays a dynamic role in building vibrant bilateral relations.”
There are estimates that place the numbers of Canadians in Hong Kong even higher.
I would say as an aside that if the current crackdown on civic liberties in Hong Kong continues we could see a large number of people leaving Hong Kong to resume residency in Canada.
And if things continue to deteriorate there we could have quite a significant increase in the number of consular cases involving Canadians in Hong Kong.
Secondly, at that time when the issue of Hong Kong’s future was in question, much of Canada's trade with China was brokered through Hong Kong. Canadian companies that did business in China typically had their headquarters in Hong Kong in those years.
So it was really very important to Canada that the transition to Chinese sovereignty be done in such a way as to protect our significant economic interests there.
We sought and received assurances from both the government of the People's Republic of China and the government of the United Kingdom over the promises of “one country-two systems” “no change for 50 years” and that “Hong Kong people would govern Hong Kong”.
With regard to the last it was clear that this meant that Hong Kong would be governed by Hong Kong people who would represent the aspirations and interests of the people of Hong Kong.
There was absolutely no indication that this would mean that the citizens of Hong Kong would be told in effect “you can elect whoever you want providing it is either Tweedledum or Tweedledee, both of whom would be representing the interests of the Chinese Communist Party and its business elite in Hong Kong” rather than the other way round.
We had good feelings about the 50 years no change formula. We understood from statements by Mr Deng Xiaoping and his successors that China intended to make a political transformation to modern norms of democracy and the rule of law.
So we were expecting that the “one country, two systems” issue would be resolved by China gradually coming into compliance with international noms of governance.
Indeed, over the period of the negotations on Hong Kong there were strong indications that this was happening already
For example, in the early 1990s China began to have free and democratic elections of village heads. We expected that this would expand upwards in a staged way to county heads provincial governors and ultimately a universal suffrage election for the President of China.
Moreover in 1998 China signed the UN's International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Canada was immediately very forthcoming with offers of developmental aid to assist the Chinese authorities in bringing Chinese law and practices into compliance with this Covenant and with assistance in how to fulfil the relevant UN reporting requirements
Indeed up until 2012 the Chinese leadership still gave periodic assurances that democratic political institutions and full rule of law were social goals, although the leaders always added the caveat that these could not be fully realised immediately due to historical, cultural and developmental factors.
So we were told should wait patiently until the moment came. That was a lot of waiting, needless to say.
But after he assumed power late in 2012, the current leader. President Xi Jinping made a series of statements strongly and explicitly renouncing key political ideals such as constitutionalism; freedom of the press, speech and assembly; judicial independence; and separation of powers as incompatible with sustained Communist Party rule in China.
One of the Party’s official newspapers the Global Times newspaper has condemned these "a ticket to hell” for China.
So I would see the recent backtracking on Hong Kong people governing Hong Kong and the fraying promise of 50 years no change as connected to this new political orientation of the Chinese Communist Party.
So where does that leave Canada?
It is clear that the Chinese government sovereignty over Hong Kong is conditioned by its international agreements comprised by the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law.
I would therefore suggest that the Government of Canada take the lead with like-minded nations informally monitoring China's compliance with the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law. It is very much in Canada's national interest to do this
Finally I would say in general that it would be prudent for Canada to respond to the Government of China's discarding of its commitment to democracy and human rights (as we understand those terms) and the moving backwards on legal protections for site Chinese citizens
by readjusting our 3 part foreign policy mix of realising Canadian prosperity, security and Canadian values in our programming with China to re-emphasise our commitment to Canadian values,
while strengthening our programming with China to promote trade and investment and to address Chinese espionage in Canada.
We are perceived as offering tacit consent for what it is happening in Hong Kong and in China at large by not speaking out and following up what we say with constructive programming.
I do not think that this will have a significant impact on our trade with China if we manage it correctly. And Canada is strengthened in our foreign relations if we gain us more respect by being true to what we believe.
Ministers Baird and Paradis noted last December 10 in their statement to mark Human Rights Day “Canada stands for what is right and just, regardless of whether it is popular, convenient or expedient.”
I believe that the people of Canada expect nothing less from us.
Wednesday, May 06, 2015
Audio of Commons Foreign Affairs C'tee Hearing on Hong Kong 05MAY15
http://www.parl.gc.ca/CommitteeBusiness/CommitteeHome.aspx?Mode=1&Cmte=FAAE&CBFunction=CalDaySelect&SelectedDate=2015-05-05T11:00:00&eventType=Past&ControlCallback=pvuWebcast&Parl=41&Ses=2&Organization=FAAE&MeetingNumber=58&Language=E&NoJavaScript=true
Charles Burton, Kwun Chung Law, Audrey Eu, by videoconference from Hong Kong, China, and Chi Fung Wong, also by videoconference from Hong Kong, China, made statements and answered questions.
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