Wednesday, August 14, 2024

Burton: There’s a strong case for banning the import of Chinese EVs

Burton: There’s a strong case for banning the import of Chinese EVs

 
 

Already buoyed by cheap labour, China’s EV manufacturers have received hundreds of billions of dollars in Chinese government subsidies to develop high-tech, attractive vehicles which could flood world markets at bargain prices and devastate domestic auto industries.


But more than suffering fiscal carnage in a price war on car lots, the darker concern is how these EVs — whose advanced software can be manipulated remotely from China — could abet Beijing’s foreign interference, even congesting Western cities and transportation systems as legions of immobilized vehicles suddenly stop working.

There is a particularly sobering realization of the role Chinese technology could play in kinetic conflict. Future wars will not be characterized by bridges being blown up in far-off lands. Technology, possibly including software embedded in cars around the world, will be used to sabotage everything from communications to transportation, health care and food supply chains.

 

China sells its EVs cheaply because of geostrategic benefit costed in; Huawei was typically 30 per cent cheaper than Nokia or Ericsson.

 

Without firing a shot, Beijing could coordinate a massive attack on our domestic stability. It could easily threaten the ability of Canadian government agencies like the Communications Security Establishment to monitor malign backdoor capabilities slipped into software updates on Chinese equipment that extend to millions of lines of code.


This issue illustrates the challenges of balancing economic benefits with national security in an increasingly interconnected world, and underscores the importance of stringent cybersecurity measures in protecting public infrastructure.

 

 

Wednesday, July 24, 2024

Burton: Canada's new top soldier needs to protect our Arctic from China

Burton: Canada's new top soldier needs to protect our Arctic from China

https://ottawacitizen.com/opinion/burton-canadas-new-top-soldier-needs-to-protect-our-arctic-from-china

As for our traditionally protective southern neighbour, regardless of how the U.S. political landscape plays out after Joe Biden’s withdrawal from this fall’s election, the days of America covering for Canada are gone. Republican policy prioritizing U.S. isolationism over international alliances reflects the sentiments of millions of Americans. The U.S. military presence around the world will henceforth be based on the costs — and benefits — to America.


So when China or Russia encroach on Arctic regions that Canada has always claimed as sovereign territory — but where we have no physical presence — it is folly to expect Donald Trump to rescue us.


If, or when, Washington slashes its funding — which presently accounts for 68 per cent of NATO’s budget — it is plausible that Canada will not help European allies cover the shortfall.


Canada could begin salvaging its reputation as a responsible ally if we were seen as legitimately trying to make strenuous efforts to defend our sovereignty with advanced technologies and a highly skilled military. To that end, Gen. Carignan should essentially put Canada on a war footing by taking prominent measures to spotlight and confront our crises of recruitment shortfalls and chronic procurement delays.

Wednesday, June 26, 2024

Charles Burton: Many know about foreign interference, but no one’s doing anything about it

Charles Burton: Many know about foreign interference, but no one’s doing anything about it

https://www.ipolitics.ca/opinions/many-know-about-foreign-interference-but-no-ones-doing-anything-about-it

Having studied the complex mechanism of Chinese influence operations on Canadian politicians, from both inside and outside government, since the 1990s, I have a good idea of who CSIS is worried about in Ottawa.

My own list includes members from all three main parties. Most have had their photos taken at events in Canada and China, the flag of China displayed prominently, standing alongside Chinese figures with known murky backgrounds.

We are dealing with a deep, serious danger that nobody seems able or willing to confront. Apparently, there things that both the Government and the Opposition want to suppress forever, and we can assume that any information the Government censored from the redacted version of NSICOP’s findings will likewise not be revealed to the public by Justice Hogue.

Canadians need CSIS to show some patriotic mettle and provide the RCMP with any information that could form the basis of criminal investigations into the serious cases.

And CSIS also needs to tell MPs and Senators suspected of lesser disloyalties that they are being monitored, and must terminate contact with foreign agent contacts immediately — or potentially face prosecution under upcoming anti-foreign interference legislation.

Friday, June 14, 2024

Thursday, June 13, 2024

Charles Burton: Canadian politicians, is China trying to foster a ‘friendship’ with you? Here’s some advice

Charles Burton: Canadian politicians, is China trying to foster a ‘friendship’ with you? Here’s some advice 

https://www.thestar.com/opinion/contributors/canadian-politicians-is-china-trying-to-foster-a-friendship-with-you-heres-some-advice/article_7c42ad60-28d3-11ef-81da-575da69ee738.html


China’s Ministry of State Security (MSS), collaborating with the Chinese Communist Party’s massive United Front Work Department, has a two-pronged strategy for turning western legislators into Beijing’s proxies.

The first tactic is huaren canzheng: getting persons of Chinese origin elected to public office, at all levels. Allegations of China’s consulate in Toronto busing in young Chinese nationals to stuff a Liberal nomination meeting and provided false IDs to suggest these youngsters were residents in the riding, is classic MSS — swaying elections in countries with lax democratic processes.

Beijing expects anyone of Chinese origin, as descendants of the mythical Yellow Emperor Huangdi, has an irrevocable requirement of loyalty to China.

The second is long-term cultivation of people who are not ethnic Chinese but who can influence Canada’s policies to promote Chinese interests. It typically starts early in a politician’s career, “spreading the net wide” to support specific candidates, often done through false-front organizations. Those who wittingly or “semi-wittingly” become China’s proxies will often be given free trips to China through “friendship associations”, including the Canada-China Legislative Association.

Wednesday, June 12, 2024